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Abstract 
In this report some of the mor*> relevant ques-
tions of advanced alarm analysis systems for 
nuclear power plant installations are described. 
The development of such alarm systems poses 
three main tasks: 
the development of formal alarm handling 
methods, 
the design of alarm patterns, 
and the development of alarm analysis sys-
tem. 
This paper deals with the major aspects of 
these three points. The c/ose relation between 
the alarm analysis and the plant disturbance 
analysis procedure is emphasized. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
An alarm system is a basic feature of a nuclear power plant 
control and supervision system. If an equipment is not in a 
specified state or a process variable goes outside specified 
limits an alarm is produced. Due to the growing unit size of 
plants, the number of alarms presented during a disturbed plant 
situation has been increasing. It is often a difficult task for 
the operator to interpret the large number of rapidly arriving 
alarms, therefore an advanced alarm analysis system is highly 
desirable. 
The purpose of the alarm analysis design is to devise a 
systematic method which when an alarm or alarm pattern occurs 
makes it possible: 
to deduce the possible prime causes of alarms, 
to predict the resulting significant faiiuras or events 
ahead, 
to determine the rough probability categories of conse-
quences , 
to present the information for the operator in a suitable, 
simple, clear form. 
Alarms are the names given to the signals arising from 
threshold detectors, such as contact switches, pressure switches, 
comparators, etc. 
It is evident that to perform these tasks a highly advanced 
alarm analysis system is needed. In addition in a lot of cases 
the existing alarm pattern is not adequate due to instrumentation 
insufficiency. Therefore alarms must not be used as the only 
basis of the analysis procedure, but must rather be used as an 
initiator for a further analysis. Prom this aspect, an alarm pat-
tern may be adequate if it only indicates the presence of sig-
nificant component failures or extreme parameter changes which 
require more detailed analysis to find the prime cause, the poss-
ible consequences, the operations to be taken. In other words 
the alarm analysis forms a part of a more detailed disturbance 
analysis system. The disturbance analysis will reduce any ambi-
guity in the alarm analysis, and make the analysis more precise, 
by using information from non-threshold devices such as pressure 
recorders, and operator supplied information. 
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The importance of an alarm analyses system depends on the 
advanced state of the detailed disturbance analysis system. In 
simple disturbance analysis systems the alarm analysis may play 
an important role of performing the tasks formerly mentioned, 
but there will generally be a relatively large range of undefined 
causes and consequences, i.e. in this case ths question of alarm 
pattern adequacy is very important. In advanced disturbance ana-
lysis systems it is not necessary that in all cases the alarm 
patterns directly be related to the disturbance situation. The 
closer the better, but it is not necessary to have unique identi-
fication of cause. The disturbance analysis system may include 
diagnosis steps, but this will be as a support for diagnosis 
within a fixed time limit and for a fixed range of possible 
causes. 
The development of an advanced alarm sys'-.am poses three main 
tasks: 
the development of formal alarm handling methods, 
the design and investigation of alarm patterns, 
and the development of alarm analysis system. 
In this paper some aspects of these problems are examined. 
Special attention is directed to the interactive real time alarm 
analysis being capable of handling several types of alarm se-
quence; non serious alarms with slow arrival or multiple non 
serious alarms with rapid arrival, or multiple serious alarms 
with rapid arrival which are accompanied by their own designed 
protective action. In case of rapid arrival of multiple serious 
alarms, the designed plant protection system is activated and 
only "post mortem" (post snutdown) alarm analysis may be carried out. 
It is noted that no attempt is made to treat all aspects of 
the design of an alarm system, only the most relevant questions 
are mentioned. 
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2. ALARM HANDLING METHODS 
Up to the present several different methods have been devel-
oped for alarm handling during abnormal situations in nuclear 
reactors and power plants. In practice three of them are used: 
alarm combinations (decision tables), alarm trees, and cause-
-consequence diagrams. Each of them has advantages and drawbacks 
to be taken into consideration before the method is implemented. 
2.1. Alarm Combinations (Decision Tables) 
Decision tables were firstly used and nowadays they are 
mainly applied in simple alarm handling systems. 
Their advantages: - simple method with a well-arranged table or 
list 
- easy to change according to experience 
- suitable for computer storage 
Their drawbacks: - all possible disturbance situations must be 
determined beforehand. Able to handle only 
alarm patterns involved in the table or list. 
2.2. Alarm Trees (Fault Trees) 
Presently fault trees are generally used for disturbance 
analysis. 
Their advantages: - relatively simple method 
- relatively easy to change (though not more 
so than decision tables) 
- suitable for computer storage 
- time delays and event sequence may be re-
corded 
Their drawbacks: - see advantages of cause-consequence diagrams. 
2.3. Cause-Consequence Diagrams 
Lately cause-consequence diagrams have been used for dis-
turbance analysis of nuclear plant status. 
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Their advantages: - directly related to the process physical 
structure 
- directly express the event sequences 
- operator interaction is made easy because of 
natural sequencing 
- vulnerable states can be handled 
- probabilities, time delays may be easily 
handled 
Their drawbacks: - in real-time interactive analysis systems 
full advantage can only be obtained with 
relatively slow changing processes, 
- analysis, checking and input of cc diagrams 
can be time consuming. 
Comparing the advantages to drawbacks of the different alarm 
handling methods mentioned above the cause-consequence diagrams 
combined with fault trees seem to be most effective for using 
in nuclear power plants. The methodology of ccd's is described 
in (1). 
3. ALARM PATTERN DESIGN 
Alarm patterns form the part of the presented information 
by the process control and information system shown in Fig. 1. 
Two main tasks arise: The possible alarm pattern design in a 
new system or alarm pattern analysis in a given fixed system. 
The design of alarm patterns can be performed during the 
design of the process instrumentation system or if modifications 
may be introduced in a given system and the existing alarm pat-
terns are not adequate. To develop proper alarm patterns the 
following questions must be answered: 
How many alarms do we need? 
Where are the alarms needed? 
What kind of alarms are needed? 
The answers to these questions are determined by technical 
and philosophical aspects. The technical aspects comprise the 
complexity and type of the process, the philosophical ones are 
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formed by the problems of the general human way of thinking. 
Considering only the technical aspects to answer the previously 
mentioned questions the following analysis steps must be carried 
out: 
1. All of the possible classes of prime disturbance events 
producing significant different consequences or requiring 
different safety actions must be distinguishable (either by 
individual alarms or alarm combinations). 
2. The time behaviour of the plant variables closely associated 
with a prime disturbance event must be determined (for all 
prime events). 
3. The possible sensor allocations, observable plant variables 
must be identified. 
4. By considering points of 2. and 3. an observable alarm pat-
tern must be defined for all considered disturbance situ-
ations . 
Due to the process instrumentation hardware limitations and 
very rapidly changing events the presented alarm pattern in a 
given alarm situation may be inadequate. 
During the design of a new alarm system the adequacy is 
automatically investigated by answering to the following ques-
tions : 
can the necessary sensors be built in or not, 
have they sufficiently rapid response or not, 
will the operator presumably be capable of following the 
events subsequent to each other, or not (if not: only post 
mortem analysis can be used). 
In a given alarm system the problem of adequacy may be in-
vestigated by 
experiments on the real process (within limited possibilities) 
or by simulation on an analog or digital model. 
During the tests the steps listed above must be followed. 
In the 3. step the given sensor allocations and the given 
observable process variables mu.';t be regarded. It must be 
noted that the simulations and possible experiments can form 
an important part of the operator training. 
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4. ALARM ANALYSIS 
4.1. Role of Alarms and Operators 
In an advanced process analysis system using ccd's and fault 
trees the role of alarms can be summarized as follows: 
informing the operator that something happened (simple ab-
normality reporting). It may be acceptable if it relates to 
a functional unit or a group of equipments closely connected 
with each other, e.g. it indicates "PIMP FAILURE" instead of 
"BEARING TEMPERATURE HIGH", 
informing the operator of the temporary consequences of an 
event (potential consequence reporting), e.g. it indicates 
"PUMP OUT", 
initiating a detailed analysis procedure, 
simplifying the analysis procedure by eliminating impossible 
or redundant event paths, 
presenting higher level alarm patterns (alarm reduction), 
making decision automatically, e.g. shutdown of the reactor, 
to prevent serious consequences, such as damage to equipment, 
injuries to operators, etc. (temporary response), 
indicating possible future events and time horizons. 
The role of the operator and advanced status of the analysis 
system are closely connected and complementary to each other. 
Namely, the more advanced analysis system we have, the less role 
is played by the operator and vice versa. In a computerized ana-
lysis system some aspects of the operator's role can be summar-
ized as follows: 
during disturbed plant situation the first analysis cycle 
can be initiated manually be the operator or automatically 
when some condition is fulfilled. The further on-line cycles 
of the cc-analysis may either be carried out at fixed intervals 
cyclically, or on request by the operator, or on initiating 
by some conditioning events, 
for all actions, except "designed protective actions", inter-
vention into the physical process may be taken only by the 
operator or under the operator's supervision. The operator 
can make actions considering the alarms presented directly 
by the plant instrumentation system and using the messages 
displayed by the diagnosis system, 
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during the interactive analysis the operator can receive 
evaluation questions fros the computer and by answering the« 
he can become the main component of the interactive decision 
making procedure, 
it is the operator who must take into account failures 
which the designer has not thought of, 
which the designer could not have considered due to the 
hardware instrumentation difficulties, 
where there are no ccd's available. 
Specially considering the last point it can be seen that the 
alarm analysis system forming a part of the process disturbance 
diagnosis system may only be a useful tool for the operator which 
helps him to select the proper actions. The aim is not to replace 
the operator but to help him. 
4.2. Steps of Analysis 
The background information on plant behaviour during a dis-
turbance situation is stored in the computer storage in the form 
of passive ccd's and alarm (fault) trees. The algorithms for ccd 
and fault tree constructions are given in (2.5). During a disturbed 
situation this passive »odel is activated by the alarms supplied 
by the plant information system. 
Whether cause or consequence search should be executed first 
depends on the speed at which analysis can be carried out, com-
pared with the plant response time. If the analysis can be made 
sufficiently fast, cause search should precede consequence search. 
In this case the different steps of the alarm analysis procedure 
can be summarized as follows: 
1. The first alarm occurs. 
2. It informs the operator on some event and requests the in-
itiating of the first analysis cycle. 
3. The cause search is initiated. 
If we suppose only one possible prime failure of a critical 
event, then only the first alarm in a cause diagram unit must be 
taken into account. 
A2, A3, A4 active alarms -» probable event: E5 (only A2 Bust 
be considered). 
In case of the supposition of simultaneous failures generating 
the same critical event (possible, but unlikely case) all prime 
events must be regarded. The active alarms together with the 
observable events in the cause tree will help to find the most 
likely events. This method is described in (3). 
Example 2.z 
A2, A3, A4 active alarms •* probable event: E5, possible event: 
E4. 
Example 3.: 
Al, A4 active alarms • probable event: (E2*E3)*E1. 
When a new alarm arrives the alarm sequence must be reevaluated 
up to date to discover if there are any new causes to be added 
as multiple events. To evaluate the new failure events all of 
the alarms present at any stage must be regarded. By keeping a 
pointer to the current position in a ccd, the work involved may 
be reduced. 
Example 4.: 
A2, A3, A4 active alarms • probable event: E5. 
A5 new active alarm •* probable events: E5, Cl 
4. The consequence search is initiated. 
After having finished the cause search, an actual alarm pat-
tern exists at the initial time moment of the consequence search. 
This alarm pattern is formed by the individual alarms received 
in a given time sequence. To find the possible event consequence 
chains the time sequential alarm pattern should be split into 
several corresponding alarm sets, i.e. causal alarm sets should 
be identified. Each causal alarm set corresponds to an event 
chain where the events are both time sequential and causal ones, 
too. 
Example 5.: 
Alarm sequence: A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A10 •* causal alarm sets: 
A4 - A5 - A10 and A4 - A6. 
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According to these new alarm sets, the possible event paths, the 
consequences, their probabilities and time horizons can be deter-
mined . 
Example 6.; 
Taking Example 5 -*• probable path: P2 
possible paths: Pi 
impossible paths: P3, P4 
When a new alarm arrives the existing causal alarm sets must be 
reevaluated up to date. As a result the previous alarm sets may 
be changed or new causal sets may by generated occasionally 
altering the possible event paths and their probabilities. 
Example 7.: 
Taking Ex. 5 and Ex. 6. 
A9 new alarm -»• causal alarm sets: A4 - A6 - A9, A4 - A5 - A10 
probable paths: PI, P2 
possible paths: 
impossible paths: P3, P4 
The alarms presented during a disturbed plant situation can 
contradict or overlap each other, therefore during the alarm 
pattern evaluation the consistency of alarms and the possibility 
of alarm reduction must be investigated. The consistency of 
alarms can be examined by using the logical elements of the ccd 
(e.g. if both branches of a decision vertex are indicated as 
TRUE), but to explore the cause of an existing contradiction 
other methods must be generally applied, for example operator 
interaction or creditlbllity evaluation. The methods of alarm 
reduc- ion can be somewhat different within an interactive ana-
lysis algorithm and during a post-mortem analysis procedure. 
The possibility of alarm reduction within an analysis algorithm 
is given by the connections of the logical elements included in 
the different possible event paths of the ccd. During the con-
sequence search the actual alarm pattern and the generated 
causal alarm sets may be pruned in the way that if an »vent 
followed by an alarm is a necessary cause to another event fol-
lowed by another alarm and the latter alarm occurs, then the 
former alarm may be omitted. In this way a simplified alarm pat-
tern and alarm sets being on a higher level may be formed. 
Finally in this alarm set an alarm may represent a critical 
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event or may be the last alarm of a true event path. 
Example 8.: 
Taking Ex. 7. 
The reduced causal alarm sets: A4 - A9, A4 - A10. 
The aim of post "designed protective action" diagnosis is to 
help the operator to understand why his plant shuts itself down. 
The problem of large number of alarms is not so great as when 
the operator has a critical safety role, but even here it is 
preferable to present "more important" alarm information first. 
There are several alarm reduction techniques which could be 
used, some rules can be the following ones: 
if A and B alarms (or more alarms) are always signalled 
together, one of them (or some of them) may be omitted, 
depending on which requires most direct action, 
causal alarms may be suppressed until requested by the 
operator, attention must be focused on critical events, 
redundant or parallel alarms may be arranged in groups 
and only group alarms must be signalled in the first 
instance. 
4.3. Data Presentation 
During plant disturbance situation the operator receives 
alarms presented by the plant instrumentation system and dif-
ferent pieces of information sent by the plant analysis system. 
The latter ones may be the following: 
messages on automatically initiated actions or on actions 
which must be taken by the operator, 
questions to be answered, 
dynamic intermediate report on analysis status, 
final report on results of the analysis. 
To present a dynamic status report the simplified ccd seems 
to be useful because it is closely adapted to the operator's 
mode of thinking. It must be a matter of further investigation 
how other methods could be used, e.g. block diagram method 
adapted for data presentation. In a simplified ccd only the 
relevant causes, events, consequences, and alarms should be 
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displayed. The irrelevant parts of the diagram, e.g. non-actual 
prime causes, impossible branches, intermediate events with less 
importance may be omitted. 
One possible method using colour CRT's for ccd-display is 
described in (4). The dynamic ccd is displayed in a four colour 
alphanumeric form. Taking into account a white/black CRT, a 
simpler method is illustrated in Pig. 3 and 4. The considered 
full-scale hypothetical cause-consequence diagram is shown in 
Fig. 2. If e.g. vie suppose an A2-A3-A4-A5-A10 sequential alarm 
pattern, the ccd can be pruned to one shown in Fig. 3. The con-
tinuous line indicates the PROBABLE event path, the dashed line 
indicates the POSSIBLE path, the impossible paths and irrelevant 
logical connections, alarms are omitted. When a new alarm arrives 
or conditions are triggered the figure must be changed, e.g. if 
C4 condition is triggered into PROBABLE and C5 is FALSE, then Pi 
path is indicated PROBABLE by the A9 alarm and the ccd must be 
changed shown in Fig. 4. It must be noted that these figures 
could further be simplified shown in Fig. 5. The probabilities 
and time horizons could also be displayed. 
A final report can be presented automatically (at the end 
of the analysis) or on request by the operator (detailed infor-
mation is needed). After having finished the disturbance analysis 
procedure, first of all a summary report must be presented con-
taining: 
the prime cause(-s) 
the critical event 
true/possible consequences with their probabilities and time 
horizons 
the actions to be taken by the operator to prevent further 
serious troubles, e.g. damage, injury. 
The form of the summary display can be simplified cause-con-
sequence diagram (see Fig. 5) or a data list. On request the 
whole ccd having been investigated should be presented. To gain 
more further information the final sequential and causal alarm 
sets, detailed plant drawings in hierarchical fashion, all mess-
ages, questions-answers, automatical-manual actions may be dis-
played. For documentation this should be produced in the hard 
copy form, also. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper summarizes some major questions of alarm analysis 
system design. During application of the principles described 
here several difficulties should be overcome, such as develop-
ment of fast real-time analysing programs and proper man-machine 
communication system. As a first step cause-consequence analysis 
algorithms and programs specially intended for alarm analysis 
purposes have been developed and described in (5). Presently the 
main efforts are made for getting sufficient experience with these 
programs on complex systems. One of the plants in which the pro-
grams are planned to be used for alarm analysis is the Paks 
Atomic Power Station in Hungary. 
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